Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME)

#### **General Principles**

#### IETF Specs for PEM and S/MIME

- RFC 1421 PEM Message Format
- RFC 1422 PEM CA Hierarchy
- RFC 1423 Cryptographic Algorithms for PEM
- RFC 1424 Certificate and CRL Comms for PEM
- RFC 2045 MIME
- RFC 2633 S/MIME

#### PEM Overview (I)

- Assumes security only at source and destination – mail gateways must see "standard mail"
- Supports private and public key algorithms
- Standard practice is private key systems for encryption and public key systems for authentication and key management

PEM Overview (II)

- Supports RSA, DSS, DES, 3DES and AES
- Allows different parts of message different levels of security
- Each part has marker before and after (e.g. *begin privacy – enhanced message* and *end privacy – enhanced message*)

## **PEM Security Levels**

- unsecured data
- integrity protected unmodified data (MIC-CLEAR) – assumes mail infrastructure will not alter message
- integrity protected encoded data (MIC-ONLY) encoding designed to prevent modification by mail infrastructure
- encoded encrypted integrity- protected data (ENCRYPTED) integrity – encrypt - encode

# **Establishing Encryption Keys**

- Per-message encryption key randomly selected
- Encryption key encrypted under destination public key
- Destination public key provided with certificate and CA chain

# PEM Certificates

- Based on X.500 names
- PEM Header contains certificates
- Hierarchical naming scheme A/B/C/D/E
  - A issues certificates for B
  - B issues certificates for C etc

• E.g. A = country = UK

- B = organisation type = academic
- C = university = Imperial
- D = department = EEE
- E = name = A.N. Other

## PEM Certificate Hierarchy (I)

- Root CA is Internet Policy Registration Authority
- Operating under root CA are Policy Certification Authorities
- 3 levels of security policy
  - High Assurance
  - Discretionary Assurance
  - No Assurance

#### High Assurance

- Strong physical security for certificate production and tamper-resistance for private key used in certification
- Strict personnel security
- Will not grant certificates to organisations with lower levels of security

**PEM Certificate Hierarchy** 

CA

NACA

CA

CA individual indviduals indviduals or CAs

CA

PCAs

various CAs

#### **Discretionary and No Assurance**

- Discretionary Assurance

  security management as for High Assurance
  no restriction on those to whom it grants certificates

  No Assurance

  issues certificates without any constraints

  Encryption
  - Randomly selected private key
  - CBC mode used with 64-bit Initialisation Vector (IV)
  - In PEM IV adds complexity to exhaustive key search on known plaintext



DACA

**IPRA** 

CA

HACA individual CA individual individual

HACA

HACA

HACA

individual

#### Source Authentication and Integrity Protection

- Add Message Integrity Code (MIC)
- Initial message digest uses MD2 or MD5
- Message digest signed with private key of public key pair

## S/MIME

- MIME is generally a multipart message
- application/pkcs7 signature holds detached signatures within a multipart signed structure
- application/pkcs7 mime allows a multipart signed message to be signed and encrypted

# S/MIME Certificate Hierarchy

- S/MIME does not specify a particular PKI
- PKI options are
  - Public certifier in which a business issues certificates with various levels of cost/assurance
  - Organisational certifier (e.g. an employer)
  - Certificates from any CA